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I. INTRODUCTION
Takings law is often characterized by commentators as nonsensical at
best and utterly chaotic at worst.' Recently, the Minnesota Supreme Court
1. See Daniel R. Mandelker, Waiving the Taking Clause: Conflicting Signals from
the Supreme Court, 1995 INST. ON PLAN. ZONING & EMINENT DOMAIN § 7.01 (blaming
recent Supreme Court takings cases such as Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,
505 U.S. 1003 (1992), for confusing takings law "more than ever"); see also Andrea
L. Peterson, The Takings Clause: In Search of Underlying Principles Part I-Takings as
Intentional Deprivations of Property Without Moral Justification, 78 CAL. L. REV. 53, 56
(1990) (describing the task of determining what constitutes a taking as "intracta-
ble"); Jeb Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YALE L.J. 1077, 1078-81 (1993) (describing the
1
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helped further the uncertainty of physical takings law in this state by refus-
ing to allow evidence of loss of highway access in the determination of
damages allowed a property owner whose land was taken by eminent do-
main.
This note addresses the loss of the property right of "access," which is
defined as "the capability to enter and leave one's land."2 In County of
3
Anoka v. Blaine Building Corp., the Minnesota Supreme Court held that
evidence of diminished access to a highway due to the construction of a
median is not admissible in determining the before and after fair market
4value of a landowner's property taken in an eminent domain proceeding.
In Blaine Building Corp., commercial landowners who had previously en-
joyed direct access to and from a roadway lost that access due to a gov-5
ernment highway improvement project. Before the construction project,
customers of the commercial businesses could access the businesses from
either side of the roadway. After the reconstruction and the addition of a
median to the highway, customers could only conveniently access the
businesses from one side of the highway. Although the landowners were
compensated for land actually taken from them in the reconstruction pro-
ject, the landowners were not compensated for damage to the value of thes
remainder land due to the loss of access. In fact, the court refused to al-
low evidence of diminished access to be considered as evidence of re-
duced market value. 9 In Blaine Building Corp., the court disregarded Min-
nesota precedent l° and instead came to an erroneous conclusion that
Takings Clause as "engulfed in confusion" and takings law as "out ofjoint;" stating
that "[t]hroughout constitutional jurisprudence, only the right of privacy can
compete seriously with takings law for the doctrine-in-most-desperate-need-of-a-
principle-prize" and defining "eminent domain" as referring "to the state's pre-
rogative to seize private property, dispossess its owner, and assume full legal right
and title to it in the name of some ostensible public good"); William Michael Tre-
anor, The Armstrong Principle, the Narratives of Takings, and Compensation Statutes, 38
WM. & MARY L. REv. 1151, 1151 (1997) (noting that the "Takings Clause" is "fa-
mous for inspiring disagreement" and that the Supreme Court "has been unable
to offer a coherent vision of when compensation is required").
2. Edward D. McKirdy, Compensation for Impairment of Rights of Access, 1988
INST. ON PLAN. ZONING & EMINENT DOMAIN § 13.01.
3. 566 N.W.2d 331 (Minn. 1997).
4. See id. at 333. For an interesting comment on the law of eminent domain,
see Winger v. Aires, 89 A.2d 521, 522 (Pa. 1952) (stating "[t]he power of eminent
domain, next to that of conscription of man power for war, is the most awesome
grant of power under the law of the land").
5. See Blaine Bldg. Corp., 566 N.W.2d at 333.
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. See id. at 334, 336.
9. See id. at 333.
10. Specifically, the court disregarded two cases. See id. at 337 (Anderson, J.
dissenting). The court ignored State v. Strom, 493 N.W.2d 554, 561 (Minn. 1992),
[Vol. 25
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adversely impacts the value of commercial property abutting highways."
This case note will first examine the background of the United States
Constitution's Takings Clause and then explore the national background
of physical takings law." The note will go on to explain Minnesota physi-
cal takings law by first examining partial takings cases" and then examin-
ing cases in an inverse condemnation context. 5 Part III examines the
facts and the majority's analysis in the Blaine Building Corp. decision, fol-
lowed by an explanation of the dissent's analysis. 16 Part IV discusses the
court's analysis and implications of that decision. Finally, this note will
conclude that the Minnesota Supreme Court has deprived landowners of
just compensation by denying them an opportunity to present evidence of'7
loss of access.
which held that in a partial taking condemnation action, evidence of construction-
related interferences and loss of visibility to the public traveling on a redesigned
highway is admissible, not as a separate item of damages, but as a factor to be con-
sidered in determining the diminution in market value of remaining property. See
id. The court also disregarded City of Crookston v. Erickson, 244 Minn. 321, 327-28,
69 N.W.2d 909, 914 (1955), which held that the depreciating effects of an entire
sewage disposal and treatment facility should be considered in determining dam-
ages to the remaining land if the use of the land constituted an integral and in-
separable part of a single use to which all the condemned land was subject. See id.
11. Strangely, the court came to a conclusion at odds with property rights at a
time when there is an apparent property rights movement underway. See DennisJ.
Coyle, Takings Jurisprudence and the Political Cultures of American Politics, 42 CATH. U.
L. REV. 817 (1993) (describing the rediscovery of property rights); see also Treanor,
supra note 1, at 1152 (stating that the property rights movement demands that
both state and national legislatures provide compensation for takings that dimin-
ish property values); Recent Legislation, Land-Use Regulation: Compensation Statutes
-FNorida Creates Cause Of Action For Compensation Of Property Owners When Regulation
Imposes "Inordinate Burden," 109 HARv. L. REv. 542, 543 (1995) (describing emerg-
ing state legislation designed to remedy perceived property rights attacks).
12. See infra Part II.A-C.
13. A "partial taking" occurs where the government takes only a portion of
land of a larger parcel belonging to the landowner. See Cynthia M. Filipovich,
Note, Inadmissibility of Governmental Highest Possible Use Evidence in A Partial Takings
Case: A Departure from Constitutional Just Compensation, 70 U. DET. MERcY L. REv.
873, 874 (1993). Partial takings cases often involve arguments as to what compen-
sation, if any, is due the landowner for any damages to the remaining land not
taken. See id.
14. See Alevizos v. Metropolitan Airports Comm'n, 298 Minn. 471, 477, 216
N.W.2d 651, 657 (1974) (describing "inverse condemnation" as "a cause of action
against a governmental defendant to recover the value of property which has been
taken in fact by the governmental defendant, even though no formal exercise of
the power of eminent domain has been attempted by the taking agency").
15. See infra Part II.D-E.
16. See infra Part III.A-C.
17. See infra Part V. For an account of cases where access, not loss of access,
to a highway actually causes a diminution in market value due to increase in noise
pollution, dust, vibrations, and other reasons, see Richard Kahn, Comment, Inverse
Condemnation and the Highway Cases: Compensation for Abutting Landowners, 22 B.C.
3
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II. BACKGROUND
A. The U.S. Constitution's Takings Clause
The United States Constitution limits the government's power of
eminent domain through the Fifth Amendment, requiring just compensa-18
tion for land taken for public use. There are two broad categories of tak-
ings claims.' 9 The first type of taking, a "physical taking," occurs when the
government has physically appropriated land for public purposes through
the exercise of eminent domain. The second type, the so-called "regula-
tory taking" occurs where a landowner claims that a government regula-
tion constructively appropriates the landowner's private property for pub-
lic purposes, without the government initiating eminent domain
proceedings.21
The Fifth Amendment, or the "Takings Clause," originally and ex-
ENVrL. ArE. L. REv. 563 (1995) and James W. Springer & David G. Mawn, Condem-
nation Law: Can a Landowner Recover for Damages Due to the Improvement?, 22 REAL
EST. L.J. 281 (1994).
18. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitu-
tion reads, "nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just com-
pensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment is made applicable to
the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See
Chicago, Burlington and Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 240
(1897) (deciding that states must adhere to the requirements of due process un-
der the Fourteenth Amendment in eminent domain cases). For a history of the
origins of the Fifth Amendment and its placement in the Constitution, see
BERNARD H. SIEGAIN, PROPERTYAND FREEDOM 13-46 (1997).
See also RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS 161-81 (1985) (discussing what con-
stitutes a "public use"); see also H. Dixon Montague, The Wonderful World of Eminent
Domain: A Factual Analysis of a Fantasy World's Determination of Just Compensation,
1992 INST. ON PLAN. ZONING & EMINENT DOMAIN § 12.02[3] (declaring that the de-
termination of a public use is a fact question).
19. See Wendie L. Kellington, Nuts and Bolts of Takings Claims, INST. ON PLAN.
ZONING & EMINENT DOMAIN § 3.02 (1997) (providing a general description of tak-
ings law).
20. See id. For example, when the government forces the purchase of prop-
erty from a landowner in order a build a highway.
21. See id. For example, when the government institutes a regulation condi-
tioning the issuance of a building permit on the landowner installing a pedestrian
and bike path. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994). For an excellent
history of regulatory takings law in Minnesota, see Floyd B. Olson, The Enigma of
Regulatoiy Takings, 20 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 433 (1994). See also Terri L. Lindfors,
Note, Prcperty-Regulatoy Takings and the Expansion of Burdens on Common Citizens,
24 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 255, 266-77 (1997) (explaining both the federal and
state court tests used in determining whether there is a regulatory taking).
22. The Fifth Amendment is also referred to as the "Eminent Domain Clause"
and the 'Just Compensation Clause," as well as the "Takings Clause." See WILLIAM
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23
clusively protected property from outright government seizure. Only in
the late 1800s would the concept of "regulatory takings" emerge where
regulations were deemed to usurp property rights to the point that the
24
regulations constituted Fifth Amendment takings. Blaine Building Corp.
concerns the first type of taking described: a government appropriation of
property through eminent domain proceedings.25
23. See FRED P. BOSSELMAN ET AL., THE TAKING ISSUE 82-104 (1973) (discussing
the history of colonial and pre-colonial takings issues). The authors state "[t]here
is no evidence that the founding fathers ever conceived that the Taking Clause
could establish any sort of restrictions on the power to regulate the use of land."
Id. at 104. See also William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Tak-
ings Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 782 (1995) (providing a
comprehensive history of takings law before the Fifth Amendment). Treanor
makes clear that the Fifth Amendment originally only applied when "the federal
government physically took private property, but not when government regula-
tions limited the ways in which property could be used." Id. at 782.
24. See Lindfors, supra note 21, at 261. See, e.g., Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S.
623, 670 (1887) (holding that a state statute prohibiting the sale or manufacture
of alcohol was not a taking of a brewery owner's property as the manufacture and
sale of alcohol was a public nuisance). Regulatory takings cases have constituted a
major expansion of Supreme Court takings jurisprudence. In Pennsylvania Coal
Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922), Justice Holmes writing for the majority,
stated that a regulation of private property is a taking if it "goes too far." This case
is regarded as the "original and most-cited Supreme Court decision on regulatory
takings." FISCHEL, supra note 22, at 13. After Pennsylvania Coal, the Supreme
Court decided other landmark regulatory takings cases. In Penn Central Transporta-
tion Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1977), the Court decided that a taking
had not occurred when a New York City historical preservation ordinance restrict-
ing development did not allow the owners of Grand Central Station Terminal to
construct a high-rise office building above the terminal. See id. at 138. In Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982), the Court found a taking
where a New York state statute compelled property owners to allow cable installa-
tion on property, stating "a permanent physical occupation authorized by gov-
ernment is a taking without regard to the public interests that it may serve." Id. at
426. In First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S.
304 (1987), the Court decided that a county ordinance forbidding a church to re-
build structures destroyed by flooding was a "temporary" taking requiring com-
pensation. See id. at 321. In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825
(1987), the Supreme Court found a taking where a grant of a building permit was
conditioned on the homeowners granting a public easement to the state. See id. at
838-39. In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), the Court
held that a taking had occurred when a regulation effectively barred Lucas from
building structures on beachfront property. See id. at 1030-32. Finally, in Dolan v.
City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994), the Court found a regulatory taking where a
city conditioned approval of a building permit on the landowner's agreement to
establish a pedestrian and bike path on her property. See id. at 395-96.
25. See County of Anoka v. Blaine Bldg. Corp., 566 N.W.2d 331, 332 (Minn.
1997).
5
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B. Physical Takings Cases
Where there is an actual physical occupation of land by the gov-
ernment, the Supreme Court is more than willing to find a compensable
taking. A brief review of Supreme Court physical takings cases illustrates
the Court's willingness to allow compensation in cases where there is a
physical invasion of property.
In an early case, Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co.,27 water overflowed 640
acres of Pumpelly's land due to the erection of a dam across Wisconsin's
Fox River.28 The building of the dam was part of a plan to use the river
water for hydraulic purposes. The defendant claimed that a state may
erect works such as dams for the good of the public, "without rendering
itself liable to individuals owning land bordering on [the] river."30 Fur-
ther, the defendant went on to argue that the plaintiff's lands "had not
been taken or appropriated" despite the permanent flooding and that
"[w]hatever may be the extent of this injury, it is remote and consequen-
tial and without remedy."'I The Supreme Court disagreed, stating "[i] t
would be a very curious and unsatisfactory result, if... it shall be held that
if the government refrains from the absolute conversion of real property
to the uses of the public it can destroy its value entirely.., without mak-
ing any compensation .... 32
In the following 100 years, floodin of land continued to be a com-
mon application of physical takings law. Other physical takings cases af-
ter Pumpelly involved whether there was a compensable taking where air-
planes flew over farm land;34 where the United States condemned a
26. See DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW 30-31 (1997) (explaining physi-
cal takings cases).
27. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871).
28. See id. at 167. Although the case arose under the Wisconsin Constitution,
which provides that "[t]he property of no person shall be taken for public use
without just compensation therefor," Wis. CONST. art. 1, § 13, the Court decided
that since the Wisconsin Constitution and the Federal Constitution had almost
identical language, it was proper to examine the question of whether the injury to
Pumpelly was within the Federal Constitution. See Pumpelly, 80 U.S. at 176-77.
29. See id. at 167.
30. Id. at 174.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 177-78.
33. See, e.g., Sanguinetti v. United States, 264 U.S. 146 (1924) (holding that
there was no taking where a canal constructed by the United States intermittently
flooded plaintiffs land); United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917) (finding a
partial taking where flooding of landowner's property occurred upon damming
rivers in Kentucky); Bedford v. United States, 192 U.S. 217 (1904) (finding that
flood damage to land as a result of improvements made upon the Mississippi River
did not constitute a taking as the flood damage was "consequential").
34. See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 260-61, 266 (1946) (holding
that the common law doctrine that ownership of land extends to the "periphery of
[Vol. 25
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laundry facility during World War 1I;31 where a coal mine was seized and
operated by the federal government in order to avert a nationwide miners
16strike; and where the federal government acquired title to uncompleted
ships making it impossible for shipbuilders to collect on construction liens
37
attached to the ships.
Years later, in 1982, the Supreme Court decided Loretto v. Teleprompter
38
Manhattan CATV Corp., taking a step forward in physical takings law. In
Loretto, a property owner bought a five-story apartment building and dis-
covered that cable television companies had installed cables on the build-
ing, both "crossovers" to serve other buildings and a cable to serve the
landlord's tenants. The television cable company had also installed two
"large silver boxes" on the roof of the building.40
New York law provided that a landlord could not interfere with the
installation of the cable lines nor demand payment from any cable com-
pany where the payment was in excess of what the state commission
deemed reasonable.4 ' The state commission had determined a one time
$1 fee was a reasonable amount of payment from a cable company to a
landlord for placement of television cables on buildings. Loretto
brought a class action lawsuit on behalf of all owners of real property in
the state on which the cable company had placed cable components, argu-
ing that the cable installations were trespass.
The Court concluded that the physical intrusion was a taking, affirm-
ing the "traditional rule that a permanent physical occupation of property
is a taking." 44 The Court rejected the practical argument that the cable
lines were a small inconvenience, stating that "constitutional protection
for the rights of private property cannot be made to depend on the size of... . 45
the area permanently occupied."
the universe . . . has no place in the modem world," but that under the specific
facts in this case, there was a compensable taking as the flights over private land
were "low and frequent").
35. See Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 4 (1949) (determin-
ing proper compensation for a temporary taking of a laundry facility during war-
time).
36. See United Statesv. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114, 116-17 (1951) (holding
that there was a taking of mining company's property, entitling respondent to
compensation under the Fifth Amendment).
37. See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 48-49 (1960) (holding that
there was a compensable taking of liens held by shipbuilders and material provid-
ers).
38. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
39. See id.
40. See id. at 422.
41. See id. at 423.
42. See id. at 423-24.
43. See id. at 424.
44. Id. at 441.
45. Id. at 436-37.
7
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In summary, the Supreme Court's physical takings decisions set forth
the general rule that no matter what the intrusion, when government oc-
cupies a piece of private property or a property right, the result is a taking
that requires compensation.
C. Loss of Access Cases
By comparison, the Supreme Court has yet to decide a case where
loss of access is deemed a compensable taking. Prior to 1900, the Su-
preme Court had decided three physical takings cases regarding loss of
46
access, but was unwilling to find a Fifth Amendment taking. In Smith v.
47
Corporation of Washington, the Court held that the Fifth Amendment did
not require compensation where the Washington, D.C. government low-
ered the grade of a public street, blocking access to a landowner's home.48
In Transportation Co. v. Chicago,49 the City of Chicago built a tunnel and
made improvements to a street, blocking access to the landowner's prop-50
erty. Once more, the Court found no compensable taking since there
was no actual physical taking of land, only the blocking of access.51 Later,
in Gibson v. United States, the federal government built a dike on the
Ohio River in Pennsylvania, blocking access to the property owner's
53
dock. The Court did not find a compensable taking; yet again there was
54
no physical invasion of the property owner's land. These cases did not
allow compensation for loss of access, and the Court consistently refused
to entertain Fifth Amendment arguments concerning lowered property
values.
D. Minnesota Partial Takings Cases
The Minnesota Constitution, like the United States Constitution, lim-
its the state's power of eminent domain and requires just compensation56
when land is taken for public use. The Minnesota Constitution confers a
46. See Treanor, supra note 23, at 795-96.
47. 61 U.S. (20 How.) 135 (1857).
48. See id. at 146.
49. 99 U.S. 635 (1878).
50. See id. at 636.
51. See id. at 642.
52. 166 U.S. 269 (1897).
53. See id. at 269.
54. See id. at 275.
55. See Treanor, supra note 23, at 796.
56. See MINN. CONsT. art. 1, § 13. The Minnesota Constitution provides,
"[p]rivate property shall not be taken, destroyed or damaged for public use with-
out just compensation therefor, first paid or secured." Id. See also State v. Strom,
493 N.W.2d 554, 558 (Minn. 1992) (noting that the Minnesota Constitution is
considered more broad than the United States Constitution due to the added lan-
[Vol. 25
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right to compensation for damaging as well as for taking57 private prop-
erty. To gain the protection of the Minnesota Constitution and receive
guage of "destroyed or damaged"). But see Edward D. McKirdy, Compensation for
Impairment of Rights of Access, 1988 INST. ON PLAN. ZONING & EMINENT DOMAIN §
13.02[2] (stating that the results in access cases do not depend on whether a par-
ticular state has a "taking" or "taking and damaged" constitution).
57. Minnesota law defines a "taking" to include "every interference, under
the right of eminent domain, with the possession, enjoyment or value of private
property." MINN. STAT. § 117.025, subd. 2 (1996); see NANCIE G. MARZULLA &
ROGERJ. MARZULLA, PROPERTY RIGHTS, UNDERSTANDING GOVERNMENT TAKINGS AND
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 23 (1997) (defining a taking as referring to "any acts
that diminish, deprive or disturb any of the legally protected rights to use, possess,
or dispose of one's acquisitions or property").
58. See Hendrickson v. State, 267 Minn. 436, 439, 127 N.W.2d 165, 169
(1964). Twenty-four other state constitutions also provide for compensation when
property is "taken or damaged" as opposed to only "taken." See ALASKA CONST. art.
1, § 18 ("Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just
compensation."); ARIZ. CONST. art. 2, § 17 ("No private property shall be taken or
damaged for public or private use without just compensation having first been
made . .. ."); ARK. CONST. art. 2, § 22 (" [P] rivate property shall not be taken, ap-
propriated or damaged for public use, without just compensation therefor."); CAL.
CONsT. art. I, § 19 ("Private property may be taken or damaged for public use only
when just compensation... has first been paid to. .. the owner."); COLO. CONST.
art. 2, § 15 ("Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public or private
use, without just compensation."); GA. CONST. art. I, § III, 1(a) ("[P]rivate prop-
erty shall not be taken or damaged for public purposes without just and adequate
compensation being first paid."); HAw. CONST. art. I, § 20 ("Private property shall
not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation."); ILL. CONST.
art. I, § 15 ("Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without
just compensation .... ); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 26-513 (1996) ("Private property shall
not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation."); LA. CONST.
art. I, § 4 ("Property shall not be taken or damaged by the state or its political sub-
divisions except for public purposes and with just compensation paid to the owner
...."); MISS. CONST. art. III, § 17 ("Private property shall not be taken or damaged
for public use, except on due compensation being first made to the owner or
owners thereof."); Mo. CONST. art. 1, § 26 ("[P]rivate property shall not be taken
or damaged for public use without just compensation."); MONT. CONST. art 2, § 29
("Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just com-
pensation . .. ."); NEB. CONST. art. I, § 21 ("The property of no person shall be
taken or damaged for public use without just compensation therefor."); N.M.
CONST. art. II, § 20 ("Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use
without just compensation."); N.D. CONST. art. I, § 16 ("Private property shall not
be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation having first been
made . .. ."); OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 23 ("No private property shall be taken or
damaged for private use, with or without compensation, unless by consent of the
owner, except... in such manner as may be prescribed by law."); S.D. CONST. art.
VI, § 13 ("Private property shall not be taken for public use, or damaged, without
just compensation . . . ."); TEX. CONST. art. I, § 17 ("No person's property shall be
taken, damaged or destroyed for or applied to public use without adequate com-
pensation being made ...."); UTAH CONST. art. I, § 22 ("Private property shall not
be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation."); VA. CONST. art.
I, § 11 ("[T]he General Assembly shall not pass any law... whereby private prop-
9
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compensation when losing a property interest, a landowner first must have
a property interest. In Minnesota, landowners have a property right to
reasonably convenient access to a public street or highway abutting land-
59
owner property.
An early Minnesota partial takings case was City of Crookston v. Erick-
son. In Crookston, private land was acquired by the city to be used as the
6'
site for a sewage treatment center and disposal plant. Although the
landowners were compensated for the taking of their land for the sewage
plant, they were not compensated for any reduction in market value of
their remaining land and the land adjoining the taken land." The trial
court held that the reduction in market value of the noncondemned por-
tions of land caused by the proximity of the sewage treatment and disposal
plant was not a factor for the jury's consideration in deciding the dam-
63
ages.
The Minnesota Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the "depreci-
erty shall be taken or damaged for public uses, without just compensation...");
WASH. CONST. art. I, § 16 ("No private property shall be taken or damaged for pub-
lic or private use without just compensation having been first made.. . ."); W.VA.
CONST. art. III, § 9 ("Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public
use, without just compensation.. . ."); WvO. CONST. art. I, § 33 ("Private property
shall not be taken or damaged for public or private use without just compensa-
tion.").
59. See Hendrickson, 267 Minn. at 440, 127 N.W.2d at 169; see alsoJohnson v.
City of Plymouth, 263 N.W.2d 603, 605 (Minn. 1978) (stating that "[i]t is well set-
tied under Minnesota law that property owners have a right of 'reasonably conven-
ient and suitable access' to a public street or highway which abuts their property");
GEORGE P. DILLARD, CURRENT CONDEMNATION LAW 89-90 (Alan T. Ackerman ed.,
1994) (explaining that in addition to landowners who abut a highway having a
general property right to access, landowners also have a right to an easement of
access to their land abutting the highway that is not given to the public generally).
Other states also recognize the right of access as a property right. See, e.g., State v.
Gorman, 596 S.W.2d 796, 797 (Tenn. 1980) (stating that "[i]t is well-settled that
the right of access to and from a public highway is a property right, which may not
be taken away, impaired or encumbered without payment ofjust compensation");
see alsoJuLius L. SAcKMAN, NICHoLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 14A.03[6] [a] (rev. 3d
ed. 1997); Kurt H. Garber, Note, Eminent Domain: When Does a Temporary Denial of
Access Become a Compensable Taking?, 25 U. MEM. L. REv. 271, 273 (1994) (stating
that the right of access is considered a property right throughout the United States
and providing a list of cases supporting that assertion).
60. 244 Minn. 321, 69 N.W.2d 909 (1955).
61. Seeid. at323,69N.W.2dat911.
62. See id. at 324, 69 N.W.2d at 912. When there has been a partial taking of
land, the damages to the remainder land are known as "consequential" or "sever-
ance" damages. See County of Anoka v. Blaine Bldg. Corp., 566 N.W.2d 331, 334
(Minn. 1997). The damages are measured by the "before and after" rule, which is
the difference in market value of the land before the partial taking and the market
value of the land after the taking. See id.; SACKMAN, supra note 59, at § 14.02[1] [a]
(discussing damages and compensation to remainder areas in general).
63. See Crookston, 244 Minn. at 324, 69 N.W.2d at 912.
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ating effect of the entire disposal plant should have been considered in
determining damages to the remaining land if the use of the land taken
constituted an integral and inseparable part of a single use to which all• 64
the condemned land was subjected." The court reasoned that where a
landowner did not actually suffer a taking but the landowner's property
was damaged because of the nature of the taking of the adjoining land,
compensation was proper because the injury of an adjoining sewage dis-
posal facility was incurred by only that landowner and not the public as a
whole.6 5 Finally, the court concluded that "where the use of the land
taken constitutes an integral and inseparable part of a single use to which
the land taken and other adjoining land is put, the effect of the whole im-
provement is properly to be considered in estimating the depreciation in
value of the remaining land."66
Several years later, the Minnesota Supreme Court decided another
partial takings case, State v. Strom.67 In Strom, the plaintiffs owned an office
68
building fronting Highway 12. After Highway 12 was rebuilt and redes-
ignated as Interstate 394, the lower grading of the new roadway impaired
the visibility of the office building to passing motorists, and the occupancy
rate of the building dropped dramatically. The court decided to admit
evidence of construction-related interferences and evidence of loss of visi-
bility to the public traveling on a redesigned roadway, not as a separate
item of damages, but as a factor to be considered in determining the
70
diminution in market value of the remainder property. The supreme
court stated that "[t]o determine the fair market value of property in a
condemnation proceeding, 'any competent evidence may be considered if
it legitimately bears upon the market value.' 7' The court further stated
64. Id. at 321-22, 69 N.W.2d at 913-14.
65. See id. at 325, 69 N.W.2d at 912.
66. Id. at 327, 69 N.W.2d at 914 (quoting Andrews v. Cox, 29 A.2d 587, 590
(Conn. 1942)).
67. 493 N.W.2d 554 (Minn. 1992). For additional discussion of this case, see
Stephen I. Adler, Road to Confusion, A.B.A.J., Nov. 1994, at 57 (describing the pos-
sible ramifications to takings law due to the holding in Strom).
68. See Strom, 493 N.W.2d at 557.
69. See id. at 558.
70. See id. at 561-62.
71. Id. at 559 (quoting Ramsey County v. Miller, 316 N.W.2d 917, 919 (Minn.
1982)) (emphasis added). See MINNESOTA DIST. JUDGES ASS'N COMM. ON JURY
INSTRUCTION GUIDES, MINNESOTA JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES (CIVIL) JIG 589 (Mi-
chael K. Steenson, rep.) in 4 MINN. PRACTICE 1, at 448 (3d ed. 1986) [hereinafter
JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES]. Instruction 589 states:
U]ust compensation to an owner when only part of a tract or property is
taken is the difference between the fair market value of the entire tract
immediately before such taking and the fair market value of what is left
after such taking. The result of this subtraction is the just compensation
to which the owner is entitled for the part taken as well as for the sever-
11
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that evidence of any matter that would influence a buyer or seller in set-
ting a price for the property may be considered, "subject to the caveat that
such proof must be competent, relevant, and material."72
These cases suggest that where a partial taking has occurred, the
primary issue for the court is how to calculate damages. In these types of
cases, the Minnesota Supreme Court has shown a willingness to permit
evidence regarding loss of access in a damages determination.
E. Minnesota Inverse Compensation Takings Cases
The crucial difference between a "partial takings" case and an "in-
verse condemnation" case is that in a partial takings case, the court has
already admitted that there has been a taking and that compensation is73
required. In an inverse condemnation case brought by the landowner,
the landowner must prove that the government is liable for a taking.74
This distinction is important because evidence is more likely to be admit-
ted where the issue is merely measuring the amount of damages, rather
than determining whether or not there is a taking.75
ance damages to the part not taken. [Give JIG 585 if not previously
given.]
Id. (alterations in original).JURYINSTRUCrION GUIDES 585 states:
[i]n determining the fair market value of the property at the time of the
taking, you will consider all facts and circumstances which a buyer and
seller in the open market would reasonably consider and which would
bear upon the question of the value of the property. Fair market value is
the price which the evidence discloses would be paid for the entire prop-
erty by a buyer who is willing, but is not required to buy, to an owner who
is willing, but is not required to sell. An owner is entitled to the value of
the property for which it may be most advantageously used.
[The fact that the owner may not have contemplated an immediate use
of the property which is its highest use is not to be considered in itself as
diminishing fair market value.]...
[Neither the value of the property to the [condemnor] or his need for
the particular property is a measure of, or a guide to, the fair market
value.]
[Fair market value is not necessarily the equivalent of the owner's in-
vestment. The owner may have acquired the property for less than it was
worth or more than it was worth, or the property may have changed in
value while it was held by the owner.]
Id. (alterations in original).
72. Strom, 493 N.W.2d at 559 (citing City of St. Paul v. Rein Recreation, Inc.,
298 N.W.2d 46, 50 (Minn. 1980)).
73. See Filipovich, supra note 13, at 879 (discussing distinction between in-
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An early Minnesota case to consider the loss of access in a taking
context was Hendrickson v. State.76 In that inverse condemnation case, the
plaintiffs owned a hotel that abutted U.S. Highway 63, a conventional two-
lane roadway approximately two miles south of the City of Rochester."
After a highway reconstruction project, the highway was changed into two
one-way surfaces, separated by a median.78 The plaintiffs no longer had
direct access to the highway, but instead had access via a circuitous route
over a service road. 79 The Minnesota Supreme Court held that a land-
owner may suffer compensable damage if the highway to which the land-
owner previously had access is rebuilt to deny or limit the landowner's
reasonably convenient and suitable access to the highway in at least one
direction. ° However, the court also ruled that a landowner has no inter-
est in the continued flow of traffic past the landowner's property and that
the state may divert traffic without being liable for economic loss that the
landowners may sustain."' The court remanded the case to the trial court,
stating that "what is reasonable ingress and egress is a fact question." 2
After Hendrickson was decided, the Minnesota Supreme Court heard
another inverse condemnation case, State v. Gannons. In Gannons, the
84plaintiff owned a restaurant in the City of St. Paul. As a result of highway
reconstruction, the lanes of the road adjacent to the landowner's property
were divided by a median to provide for one-way traffic running in north-
erly and southerly directions, and Gannon's immediate access to the main
road was made circuitous via a frontage road.85 The court ruled that the
76. 267 Minn. 436, 127 N.W.2d 165 (1964). Prior to Hendrickson, Minnesota
decisions held that a property owner was not entitled to compensation when ac-
cess to property was made more circuitous by road construction, traffic regulations
or land developments, or because the flow of traffic was diverted from the highway
that the landowner's land abutted. See Note, Abutting Property Owners Entitled to
Compensation for Deprivation of Reasonably Convenient Access to Main Thoroughfare, 49
MINN. L. REv. 198, 199 (1964).
77. See Hendrickson, 267 Minn. at 437, 127 N.W.2d at 167.
78. See id.
79. See id. at 437, 127 N.W.2d at 167-68.
80. See id. at 444-45, 127 N.W.2d at 172. But seeJohnson v. City of Plymouth,
263 N.W.2d 603, 605-07 (Minn. 1978) (holding that an impairment of access rights
due to the construction of a curb and gutter on plaintiff's property was not a com-
pensable taking except where it is shown that such construction deprives the
owner of reasonably convenient and suitable access); State v. Gannons, 275 Minn.
14, 23-24, 145 N.W.2d 321, 329 (1966) (holding that loss of access to main thor-
oughfare was not a compensable taking if reasonable access was available in at
least one direction).
81. See Hendrickson, 267 Minn. 436 at 442, 127 N.W.2d at 170-71.
82. Id. at 445, 127 N.W.2d at 172.
83. 275 Minn. 14, 145 N.W.2d 321 (1966).
84. See id. at 16, 145 N.W.2d at 324.
85. See id. at 16-17, 145 N.W.2d at 324-25.
13
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86dividing of a roadway by median strips cannot compel compensation.
The court then reversed and ordered a new trial, holding that the jury
may have become confused by the jury instructions that compensable
damages occurred when reconstruction denied the owner reasonable,87
convenient, and suitable access to the road in at least one direction.
By comparison, although relying on the court's statements in Hen-
drickson, the Minnesota Supreme Court found a taking in Johnson Brothers
Grocery, Inc. v. State. In Johnson Brothers, the plaintiff operated a retail liq-
uor store on Hudson Road, parallel to and with access to Highway 12.s 9 In
1973, access to Highway 12 was lost as that highway was reconstructed into
Interstate 94.90 Thus, the property owners lost direct and unlimited access
to an abutting highway due to the rebuilding of that highway into a di-
vided, four-lane "limited access" highway. 9 1 Accordingly, the court found
that the particular actions of the state compelled compensation in this
92case.
Another important physical takings case in Minnesota also allowed a• 93
landowner to be compensated. In Spaeth v. City of Plymouth, an inverse• 94
condemnation case and an echo of Pumpelly, a large portion of a prop-
erty owner's land was flooded as a consequence of a city's development
95plan. The City of Plymouth argued it was not liable for the flooding of
Spaeth's land, as it could not be held liable for mere "planning."96 The
court disagreed, upholding the trial court's ruling that the city's actions
constituted a taking.
Other inverse condemnation cases in Minnesota include Caponi v.98
Carlson, where the Minnesota Court of Appeals, relying on Spaeth and
86. See id. at 23, 145 N.W.2d at 329.
87. See id. at 24-25, 145 N.W.2d at 329.
88. 304 Minn. 75, 229 N.W.2d 504 (1975).
89. See id. at 76, 229 N.W.2d at 504.
90. See id. at 77, 229 N.W.2d at 505.
91. See id. A "limited access" or "controlled-access" highway is a "highway es-
pecially designed to expedite and control through traffic, primarily by means of
median dividers or strips, elimination of grade level intersections, and limitation
of access to specific interchanges or access ramps at designated intervals." See
Roland F. Chase, Annotation, Abutting Owner's Right to Damages for Limitation of Ac-
cess Caused by Conversion of Conventional Road into Limited-Access Highway, 42
A.L.R.3d 13, 19 (1972).
92. Johnson Bros., 304 Minn. at 77, 229 N.W.2d at 505.
93. 344 N.W.2d 815 (Minn. 1984).
94. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871). See supra notes 27-32 and accompanying
text.
95. See Spaeth, 344 N.W.2d at 822.
96. See id. at 820.
97. See id. at 822. But see Love v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 407 N.W.2d 452
(Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that there was no compensable taking where
flooding on property owner's land was found to be intermittent).
98. 392 N.W.2d 591 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
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Loretto, found a taking when the City of Eagan designated part of Caponi's•99
land as a storm water holding pond, and Wegner v. Milwaukee Mutual In-
surance Co.,100 where the Minnesota Supreme Court found a taking when
an innocent third party's home was damaed by police spreading tear gas
in the course of apprehending 
a suspect.
In conclusion, the Minnesota Supreme Court is willing to grant
compensation for a taking in inverse compensation cases where a gov-
ernment entity floods land or gases a home. 0 2 However, the court is less
willing to grant compensation for loss of access in inverse condemnation
cases, where the primary issue is whether a taking has even occurred, as
compared to partial takings cases which acknowlede the taking and the
issue is the determination of appropriate damages.
III. THE BLAINE BUILDING CORP. CASE
A. The Facts
As part of a project to reconstruct County State-Aid Highway Number
51, also known as University Avenue Northwest, Anoka County decided to104
widen the road and install a median strip. The new median strip was
not constructed on land previously owned by the landowners, but instead
on the pre-existing right-of-way.10° Even so, to accomplish the widening
and median placement, the county brought eminent domain proceed-a 06
ings to acquire land from four parcels of commercial property abutting
University Avenue.'0 7 Blaine State Bank and a gas station/convenience
store, Finaserve, were located on the parcels of land.
10 8
Of particular concern to the property owners, the median con-
99. See id. at 595.
100. 479 N.W.2d 38 (Minn. 1991).
101. See id. at 41-42.
102. See, e.g, Wegner, 479 N.W.2d at 41-42; Caponi, 392 N.W.2d at 595; Spaeth,
344 N.W.2d at 822.
103. See, e.g., State v. Gannons, 275 Minn. 14, 145 N.W.2d 321 (1966); Hen-
drickson v. State, 267 Minn. 436, 127 N.W.2d 165 (1964).
104. See County of Anoka v. Blaine Bldg. Corp., 566 N.W.2d 331, 333 (Minn.
1997).
105. See id.
106. See id. The eminent domain proceedings were properly brought pursuant
to Chapter 117 of Minnesota Statutes. See id. See also MINN. STAT. ch. 117 (1996).
107. See id. Parcels 18, 19, 20 and 21 were affected. See id. The county ac-
quired a 27-foot strip of land from parcels 18, 19, and 20 and an 18.7-foot strip of
land from parcel 21. See id.
108. See id. Finaserve, Inc. was the fee record owner of parcels 20 and 21. See
Appellants' Brief at 2, Blaine Bldg. Corp. (Nos. C5-95-1584, C7-95-1585). The
Blaine Building Company was the fee record owner of parcel 18, with Blaine State
Bank as a lessee. See id. The Bacon, Harstad & Savelkoul Company (a partnership)
was the fee record owner of parcel 19 with Blaine State Bank as a lessee. See id.
15
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structed as part of the project prevented left turns into and out of the sub-
ject properties along University Avenue. 09 Before the construction began,
vehicles could turn into the owners' properties while traveling in either
the northbound or southbound direction.1 The new median made it
impossible for potential customers to access the businesses from the
southbound lanes other than by an inconvenient route; however, access. .111
from the northbound lanes remained unchanged.
The commissioners' appointed by the county to determine damages
due each property owner for the partial taking, recommended compensa-
tion for loss of traffic access to and from the southbound lanes of Univer-
sity Avenue.2
Subsequently, the county sought and received partial summary
judgment overturning the commissioners' award, arguing that the prop-
erty owners were not entitled to introduce evidence of the partial loss of
traffic access as part of the damages estimate. 1 3 The landowners appealed
the trial court's decision, 114 and the court of appeals affirmed the grant of
summary judgment.1
B. The Majority's Analysis
The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the trial
court and the court of appeals, holding that "the loss of traffic access may
not be the basis of severance damages where a property owner is subject to
a partial taking and coincidentally loses access due to the construction
109. See Blaine Bldg. Corp., 566 N.W.2d at 333.
110. See id.
111. See id.
112. See id. The commissioners were appointed pursuant to section 117.075 of
the Minnesota Statutes. See id. The court-appointed commissioners included real
estate appraisal and management specialists, and one commissioner possessed
knowledge of the convenience retail industry. See Appellants' Brief at 3, Blaine
Bldg. Coip. (Nos. C5-95-1584, C7-95-1585).
113. See Blaine Bldg. Corp., 566 N.W.2d at 333.
114. The landowners initially brought two separate actions, one concerning
parcels 18 and 19 and one concerning parcels 20 and 21. See County of Anoka v.
Maego, Inc., 541 N.W.2d 375 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996), affd sub nom. County of
Anoka v. Blaine Bldg. Corp., 566 N.W.2d 331 (Minn. 1996). The two cases were
consolidated on appeal. See Blaine Bldg. Corp., 551 N.W.2d at 333. Interestingly, in
County of Anoka v. Esmailzadeh, 498 N.W.2d 58 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993), a case with
almost identical facts as Maego, and an opinion written by the same judge, the
court held that loss of access was a compensable taking. See id. at 59.
115. See Maego, 541 N.W.2d at 379.
116. Justice Anderson, dissenting, disagreed with the majority's characteriza-
tion of the loss of access as "coincidentally" occurring with the partial taking as the
installation of the median and the partial taking to widen the street were one inte-
grated project. See Blaine Bldg. Corp., 566 N.W.2d at 340 (Anderson,J., dissenting).
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of a median barrier."
17
118
Justice Gardebring, writing for the majority, explained that the
court was concerned that allowing evidence of market value diminution
would overcome the longstanding rule that loss of access from the con-
struction of a median is not a compensable taking in Minnesota. 119 The
court further stated that allowing the landowners to introduce evidence of
loss of access for purposes of the determination of damages would allow
the landowners to "do indirectly what they cannot do directly: be compen-
sated for the loss of traffic access from one side of the roadway when they
retain access to the other side."'
The court also noted that the appellants could not recover damages
for loss of access since the median was not constructed on land actually
taken from the landowners, but on land that was already part of the right-121
of-way. This fact barred introduction of loss of access evidence in the
determination of damages. 1' 2 According to the court, an owner is not en-
titled to damages caused to the landowner's remainder land by the use of
additional land acquired from other parties notwithstanding the fact that
all of the land is used in the same project. 
13
The court then declined to apply an exception to the general rule
which, on occasion, may provide compensation for damage to remainder
land where the taken land and adjoining remainder land form one proj-124
ect. The exception is found in Crookston, where the court allowed a
landowner to obtain severance damages for the construction of a sewage
treatment plant even though the facility was built on land that simply ad-S .125
joined the taken land. The Crookston court enunciated the "exception"
by stating "[w] here the use of the land taken constitutes an integral and
inseparable part of a single use to which the land taken and other adjoin-
117. Id.at336.
118. Justice Anderson dissented in this case, joined by Chief Justice Keith. See
id. at 337-41. Justice Blatz took no part in the consideration or decision. See id. at
337.
119. See id. at 335; see also State v. Gannons, 275 Minn. 14, 23, 145 N.W.2d 321,
329 (Minn. 1966) (stating that "the dividing of a roadway by median strips or di-
viders cannot be made the subject of compensation in condemnation"); Sackman,
supra note 59, at § 14A.03[6] [a] (stating that installing a median strip is generally
considered by courts to be a valid exercise of the state's police power and is not
compensable).
120. Blaine Bldg. Corp., 566 N.W.2d at 335.




125. See City of Crookston v. Erickson, 244 Minn. 321, 327-28, 69 N.W.2d 909,
914 (Minn. 1955) (finding it impossible to apportion the damages between the
part of the sewage treatment facility project using the landowner's land and the
other land used in the project).
17
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ing land is put, the effect of the whole improvement is properly to be con-
sidered in estimating the depreciation in value of the remaining land."
26
Finally, the majority explained that holding loss of access evidence
admissible in this case would "yield future inequitable results." 27 The rea-
soning was that if landowner A lost access to a road but had no land actu-
ally taken and landowner B lost access to the same road and suffered a
taking of land, only landowner B would be compensated since there can-
not be compensation for loss of access without a physical taking occurring
simultaneously.128
C. The Dissent's Analysis
Justice Anderson's dissent attacked the majority's opinion as incor-
rect for three reasons.12 9 First, Justice Anderson considered the majority's
reading of Strom as "unduly narrow."30 Next, the dissent pointed out that
the case law relied upon by the majority in its opinion involved inverse
condemnation actions and that such cases do not dictate the same result
as partial takings cases.' 3 ' Finally, the dissent found that the court's deci-
sion in Crookston supported admission of the loss of traffic access to de-
termine whether the partial taking of the landowner's property consti-
tuted an "integral and inseparable" part of the roadway reconstruction
project.132
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE BLAINE BUILDING CORP. DECISION
Blaine Building Corp. presents the same "very curious and unsatisfac-
tory result" that the United States Supreme Court warned of more than a
century ago in Pumpelly.133 In Blaine Building Corp., the court not only re-
fused to allow compensation for the loss of the property right of access
due to installation of a median, but did not even allow evidence of the in-
stallation of a median to be considered by the juryin determining diminu-
tion of market value of the remainder property. In doing so, the court
126. Id. at 327, 69 N.W.2d at 914 (citing Andrews v. Cox, 29 A.2d 587, 590
(Conn. 1942)). See supra notes 60-66 and accompanying text.
127. Blaine Bldg. Corp., 566 N.W.2d at 336.
128. See id.
129. See id. at 337 (Anderson,J., dissenting).
130. See id. (Anderson,J., dissenting). The majority asserted that Strom was dis-
tinguishable from Blaine Bldg. Corp. because Strom dealt with loss of visibility rather
than just loss of access. See id. at 335 n.1.
131. See id. at 339 (Anderson,J., dissenting).
132. See id. at 340 (Anderson,J., dissenting).
133. See Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166, 177-78 (1871); su-
pra notes 27-32 and accompanying text.
134. See Blaine Bldg. Corp., 566 N.W.2d at 333. It is interesting to note that
Minnesota courts have allowed other types of evidence in eminent domain pro-
[Vol. 25
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has created a situation that further erodes property ights in the ever ex-
panding metropolitan area of the Twin Cities. The decision breaks with
the precedent found in Strom and Crookston and quashes any hope for a
remedy for businesses likely to be similarly impacted with highway con-
struction.1
36
A. The Court Ignored the Strom Decision
Unfortunately, in deciding Blaine Bldg. Corp., the majority side-
stepped the logic found in Strom. In Strom, evidence of construction-
related interferences and loss of visibility of the landowner's property to
the public was deemed to be admissible as evidence in calculating the137
diminution in market value of the remainder property. Both loss of
visibility and loss of access play a major role in reversing favorable market
value of a business.138
A better approach for the majority would have been to consider loss
of access at least as important, if not more so, than loss of visibility. As the
Strom court recognized, the fact that drivers can no longer view a business
from the roadway is an obvious detriment to the property value. 3 9 The
ceedings. See, e.g., State v. Harbor Oil Co., 486 N.W.2d 455, 457 (Minn. Ct. App.
1992) (holding the "trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing jury to hear
and consider expert testimony that nonconforming use status increased property's
market value" and in admitting "testimony of avoided costs as substitute for market
data"); see also County of Ramsey v. Miller, 316 N.W.2d 917, 922 (Minn. 1982)
(holding that "specific numerical, analytical and illustrative evidence" which sup-
ports an appraisal, "specific prices of comparable sales" in the area, "assessed
valuation of the property as shown in the county auditor's records," and the
"owner's acquisition costs and money expended for improvements" are all admis-
sible in an eminent domain proceeding).
135. See William B. Stoebuck, The Property Right of Access Versus the Power of Emi-
nent Domain, 47 TEX. L. REV. 733 (1969) (explaining that the urbanization of
American society has greatly increased the power of eminent domain nationwide);
see alsoJames E. Brookshire, The Delicate Art of Balance-Ruminations on Change and
Expectancy in Local Land Use, 38 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1047 (1997) (describing diffi-
culties in land-use planning, including highway reconstruction projects, due to
population increases in Washington, D.C. area).
136. As possible evidence of the effect of loss of access on the businesses in-
volved in this case, the gas station and convenience store that had operated on
parcel 21 at the time of the condemnation proceeding is now a vacant commercial
building. See County of Anoka v. Maego, Inc., 541 N.W.2d 375, 376-77 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1996), affd sub nom. County of Anoka v. Blaine Bldg. Corp., 566 N.W.2d 331
(Minn. 1997).
137. See State v. Strom, 493 N.W.2d 554, 560-61 (Minn. 1992); supra notes 69-
74 and accompanying text.
138. See Garber, supra note 59, at 271 (describing the difficulties faced by busi-
nesses due to highway reconstruction).
139. See Strom, 493 N.W.2d at 561. The court states "[i]tems such as view, ac-
cess to beach property, freedom from noise, etc. are unquestionably matters which
a willing buyer in the open market would consider in determining the price he
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loss in value is particularly burdensome when the business is one that re-
lies on "drop-in" customer business, such as a fast food or 24-hour restau-
rant, or a gas station and convenience store. The court has been willing to
recognize that evidence of the loss of the property right of visibility from
the roadway should be admitted as a factor to be considered by the finder
of fact in determining the diminution in market value of the remainder
140
property.
However, the "access" property right, although equally as valuable as
the "visibility" property right to drop-in type businesses is not considered
compensable by the court, nor is evidence of the loss of access even ad-
missible.14 1 Yet for these types of businesses, catering to the rushed con-
sumer, mere "visibility" with no readily apparent method of access is
pointless. A consumer looking for a quick drive through meal or a cus-
tomer needing gasoline will not necessarily be willing to take the time to
determine which exit or frontage road leads back to the fast food restau-
rant or gas station he or she just passed on the busy highway. More likely,
that consumer will continue on to the next convenient establishment.
B. The Court Failed to Extend the Crookston 'Exception"
Moreover, the court defied precedent and logic when it failed to ap-
ply the Crookston analysis to this case. In Crookston, the court allowed evi-
dence of diminished value of remainder property where a sewage facility
was built upon land adjoining the taken land. In contrast, the Blaine
Building Corp. court refused to allow evidence of diminished value of re-
mainder property where a median blocking access was built upon land ad-• . .143
joining the taken land. Those two fact situations are not fundamentally
different, 144 but the majority came to a different conclusion in Blaine
Building Corp. A more consistent approach for the court to take would
have been to follow the precedent found in Crookston.
The obvious underlying reason for the majority's failure to extend
Crookston to median cases is the potential financial burden placed on state
and local governments; they would have to pay property owners who lose
access due to the installation of a median. Median development is
would pay for any given piece of real property." Id. (quoting People v. Volunteers
of Am., 98 Cal. Rptr. 423, 431 (1971)).
140. See Strom, 493 N.W.2d at 561.
141. See Blaine Bldg. Corp., 566 N.W.2d 331, 334-35.
142. See City of Crookston v. Erickson, 244 Minn. 321, 327-28, 69 N.W.2d 909,
914 (1955).
143. See Blaine Bldg. Corp., 566 N.W.2d at 335.
144. For instance, the court in Strom discussed the property owner's loss of ac-
cess during construction as one of the property owner's problems. See Strom, 493
N.W.2d at 557-58.
145. See Strom, 493 N.W.2d at 560. In that case, the court discussed the state's
argument, that on a policy level, allowing admission of evidence on construction-
(Vol. 25
20
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 1 [1999], Art. 10
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol25/iss1/10
1999] COUNTY OF ANOKA V. BLAINE BUILDING CORP. 349
widespread due to increased traffic pressure in the Twin Cities. Requiring
municipalities to compensate for the taking of the access property right
would be costly. Perhaps the history of this "well settled" question may be
based on a fiscal concern, rather than on Minnesota's Constitution.
C. The Court Relied on Inverse Condemnation Cases
Finally, and most importantly, the majority erroneously relied on in-
verse condemnation cases in its decision. Inverse condemnation cases
are not dispositive in a partial takings case. 4 7 As the dissent stated, it is
unfortunate that the majority relied on inverse condemnation cases be-
cause "inverse condemnation precedent confuses the threshold issue of
whether a property owner is entitled to compensation with the true issue
in this case: whether evidence of diminished access is admissible to estab-
lish the proper measure of damages when there has been a partial tak-• 148
ing." Thus, in Blaine Building Corp., the majority spends much of the
opinion arguing the reasons for denying compensation, when the issue of
whether or not compensation will be awarded is not in dispute, instead of
discussing any reasons as to why the evidence of diminished access is not
admissible.
A better and more coherent approach for the majority would have
been to exclusively rely on partial takings cases in making its decision. In-
verse condemnation cases are instituted by a landowner to try to prove
that property has been taken. 49 In Blaine Building Corp., property had
related interferences would render highway projects "prohibitively expensive." See
id. However, the court rejected that argument as "not a reason to under-
compensate abutting landowners." Id.
146. See Blaine Bldg. Corp., 566 N.W.2d at 339 (Anderson, J., dissenting). For
example, the majority relied on State v. Cannons, Inc., 275 Minn. 14, 145 N.W.2d
321 (1966) (holding that loss of access in one direction is not compensable) and
Hendrickson v. State, 267 Minn. 436, 127 N.W.2d 165 (1964) (stating that property
owners have no vested rights in the continued flow of traffic past their property).
See Blaine Bldg. Corp., 566 N.W.2d at 339.
147. See id. (Anderson,J., dissenting).
148. Id. (Anderson, J., dissenting). To support his point, Justice Anderson
cites a Texas case, State v. Schmidt, 805 S.W.2d 25 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991), rev'd on
other grounds, State v. Schmidt, 867 S.W.2d 769 (Tex. 1993). In that case, the Texas
Court of Appeals observed that the argument of the State:
mixes indiscriminately the rules which govern two distinctly different
elements of a condemnation action: (1) the substantive rules applicable
to a determination of whether the owner has a legal right to compensa-
tion; and (2) the substantive and evidentiary rules applicable to a calcula-
tion of the owner's compensation once [the owner] has established a le-
gal right to it.
Id. at 29.
149. See Alevizos v. Metropolitan Airports Comm'n, 298 Minn. 471, 477, 216
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been taken and there was no dispute as to the fact that compensation was
required, as is the case in other partial takings cases.1 50 Thus, the line of
cases presented by the majority are, as the dissent pointed out, "not help-
ful in that they address only the issue of whether a compensable taking
has occurred and shed little light on the proper measure of damages. .. .. ,,151
when, as here, the right to compensation is indisputable.
Although Minnesota's Constitution intends to justly compensate
those whose land is taken by the state, here, the Minnesota Supreme
Court is not allowing full compensation in refusing to admit evidence of
loss of access to determine diminution in market value of the properties.
The constitutional clause that requires compensation "was designed to bar
Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens,
which in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a
whole." 152 Unfortunately, the landowners in this case are bearing a public
burden literally without the public, or at least with diminished access to
the public.
V. CONCLUSION
As more limited access highways are built and medians installed,
more commercial and residential landowners will experience loss of ac-
cess. Obviously, if a business loses access, it also loses customers, and the
market value of the property correspondingly decreases as the site be-
comes less desirable for potential buyers. The holding in Blaine Building
Corp. furthers the uncertainty for business owners by barring compensa-
tion for loss of access due to highway work done ostensibly for the public
good. Ultimately, the court's holding causes concern for those business
owners whose land abuts a highway that is about to undergo construction.
Alisonj Midden
N.W.2d 651, 657 (1974) (quoting Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 376 P.2d 100,
101 (Or. 1962)).
150. See Blaine Bldg. Corp., 566 N.W.2d at 334.
151. Id. at 339 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
152. Wegner v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co., 479 N.W.2d 38, 40 (Minn. 1991)
(quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
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